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A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES CONTROLS
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND OPERATIONS:
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
Christopher F. Corr*

INTRODUCTION
Foreign investment in the United States in recent years has provoked
extensive, sometimes passionate discussion. Commentators have painted
a disturbing portrait of a nation that is dangerously defenseless against
an onslaught of strategic foreign buyouts and acquisitions,' and have

* Attorney, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Steve Tobocman in the preparation of this Article.
1. See, e.g., MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN J. TOLCHIN, SELLING OUR SECURITY:
THE EROSION OF AMERICA'S ASSETS 10-12 (1992) [hereinafter TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN,
SELLING] (proposing that foreign investment threatens America's economic and political security); MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How
FOREIGN MONEY IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 203-04 [hereinafter
TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, BUYING] (arguing that foreign debt compromises the United
States' ability to function as a sovereign nation in much the same manner as foreign
debt has hampered the economic choices of the Latin American debtor nations). The
Tolchins present a shocking picture of a "United States industrial base hemorrhaging
technology so dramatically that entire industries are in danger of going the way of
VCRs and color TVs." Paul Magnusson, America's Dangerous Liaisons, BUS. WK.,
Nov. 2, 1992, at 16; see also Marc Levinson, The Hand Wringers, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
26, 1992, at 44 (stating that the Tolchins argue that "the government should restrict
foreign investment to keep companies in American hands where 'national security' is
involved"). Some commentators characterize foreign investment as an economic "war"
in which America does not defend itself. DOUGLAS FRANTZ & CATHERINE COLLINS,
SELLING OUT: How WE ARE LETTING JAPAN BUY OUR LAND, OUR INDUSTRIES, OUR

125-26 (1989). American leaders do not
perceive the foreign conquest because American business and politics lack the longterm planning that would reveal the constraints that foreign investment makes on
America's ability to make. independent decisions. Id. at 127. Recently, U.S. leaders
have begun to face the problems of foreign investment. See LAURA D. TYSON,
WHO'S BASHING WHOM: TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 291
(1992) (summarizing a change of attitude in the Bush Administration to examine the
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND OUR FUTURE
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called for increased restrictions and stricter enforcement.2 The policy
debate in the United States has centered largely on the merits versus the
risks of uncontrolled foreign investment? There has been little discussion or contemplation of the regime for controlling foreign investment
currently in place.4
The United States, in fact, maintains a variety of direct and indirect
federal controls on foreign investment and operations under disparate
statutes that are enforced by a variety of agencies. Numerous state laws
add to the regulatory array. Consequently, the system at times lacks
coherence and effectiveness in carrying out national investment objectives.5 The lack of coherence results from the virtual absence of a cornpossible benefits of a governmental role in protecting selected American high-technology areas from exploitation by foreign investors); Jim Adams, French Group Withdraws Bid for LTV Missile Subsidiary, Reuters Bus. Rep., July 6, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BUSRPT File (expressing Senator Byrd's opposition to the
foreign purchase of industrial components that are critical for U.S. military security):
U.S. Congressional Leader Urges Investment Curbs, Japan Econ. Newswire, Feb. 27,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, JEN File (quoting House Majority Leader
Gephardt in urging the President to assert more control over the incursions of foreign
investment).
2. See Eron-Florio Said to Be Inadequate, More Stringent Controls Needed,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 93, at A-5 (May 14, 1991) (reporting that
Congressmen Levine and Wolf called for stronger U.S. controls over foreign investment). The Congressmen pointed to the importance of high technology weaponry in
minimizing U.S. casualties in the Persian Gulf war. Id. Permitting foreign investment
in high technology weapons manufacturers would weaken the U.S. control of access
to weapons development methodologies. Id.
3. See Paul Magnusson, Why Corporate Nationality Matters, BUS. WK., July 12,
1993, at 142 (contrasting the views of Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, and
Chairperson of the Council of Economic Advisors, Laura D'Andrea Tyson). Mr. Reich
maintains that within the global economy, the critical factor is who has the jobs, not
who owns the corporation. Id. Ms. Tyson, however, insists that foreign investors use
their position as owner to gain access to critical technology. Id. Thus, foreign investors can benefit from United States government-sponsored research. Id. See also EDWARD GRAHAM & PAUL KRUGMEN. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED

119-60 (1991) (providing an overview of current U.S. policy and policy alternatives toward foreign direct investment).
STATES

4. See SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE

237-40 [hereinafter TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING] (reviewing the general policy direction of the Reagan and Bush Administrations to deregulate even in the face of increased coordination among foreign competitors seeking
to dominate U.S. markets and the U.S. Government); TYSON, supra note 1, at 290-93
(explaining that there is a general. perception that the federal government should minimize the intrusion of its regulations in investment operations).
5. See Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States Investment
RUSH TO DEREGULATE
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monly understood, uniform policy or scheme underlying the various
federal statutes. Furthermore, fragmentation of jurisdiction inhibits efforts
to identify and monitor whether regulations are consistently applied and
whether the system in its entirety serves and protects U.S. interests.'
This legal framework also can disadvantage foreign investors who have
trouble identifying the overlapping controls that may apply to a contemplated transaction, which, in turn, obscures an accurate analysis of investment risks, with potentially severe consequences.'

The current system of U.S. foreign investment controls therefore warrants a comprehensive review.' A review of all controls should include

not only explicit restrictions on foreign direct investment9 in U.S. entities, but also those on U.S. operations of foreign-owned businesses
which can impede foreign investment." Moreover, the various reporting
requirements imposed upon foreign investors should be viewed as part

Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 159
(1989) (stating that U.S. reactions to foreign investment "appear schizophrenic" by
restricting the foreign investments that other policies expressly attempt to expand);
Cecelia M. Waldeck, Note, Proposals for Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under the
Exon-Florio Amendment, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 1175, 1214 (1991) (noting that the legislation for controlling foreign investment does not define the security or investment
objectives of regulation). Neither agencies nor investors have statutory or regulatory
standards to coordinate future actions with other public and private actors. Id. at
1253.
6. See Waldeck, supra note 5, at 1252 (describing the multiplicity of parties and
interests among the agencies responsible for administering the legislation controlling
foreign investments).
7. See Waldeck, supra note 5, at 1253-54 (stating that the legislation controlling
foreign investments does not provide explicit policy directives against which an administrator could measure program effectiveness).
8. See Waldeck, supra note 5, at 1252-54 (arguing that re-organization, rather
than redesign, of current controls on foreign investments would provide adequate
protection with minimal disruption of investor expectations).
9. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC AND STATISTICS
ADMINISTRATION, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE

1 (1993) (defining the investment areas of concern for controlling foreign investment).
While not an easily or consistently defined term, "foreign direct investment" is generally viewed as the foreign purchase of 10% or more of a U.S. business enterprise.
Id. See also EDWARD GRAHAM & PAUL KRUGMEN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 7 (1991) (addressing the general difficulties in defining foreign
direct investment).
10. See TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING. supra note 4, at 10 (stating that
regulatory reform must consider all significant burdens of alternative regulations). The
significant burdens of regulation include report generation costs, agency delays in
approvals, and attention to regulations during planning. Id.
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of the regulatory regime, as regulatory reports also may burden and
discourage foreign investment.
This Article seeks to examine the entire federal system of controls on

foreign investment in the United States as a necessary starting point for
reconsideration of the system. Accordingly, the analysis divides U.S.
controls into three general categories: Part I discusses general investment
controls; Part II examines restrictions on investment and operations in
specific commercial areas; and Part III analyzes requirements for reporting investment activity." The Article addresses only the federal laws
and regulations affecting foreign investment. It is important to bear in
mind, however, that foreign investors also are subject to separate sectorspecific restrictibns in many states, which further impede foreign investment and which may have no rational connection to federal law or policy. 2

I.

GENERAL INVESTMENT CONTROLS
A.

EXON-FLORIO REVIEW

1. Overview
The 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of
1950 3 (Exon-Florio or the Amendment) is the primary and most controversial law governing foreign investment in the United States. 4 Un-

11. See infra Parts II-IV (analyzing competing U.S. policies and controls on foreign investment).
12. See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 157-58 (reviewing state laws that either imitate
or contradict federal restrictions on foreign investment). Roughly half of the states
apply some type of control on foreign investment, typically in the areas of real estate
and natural resources. Id. For example, Hawaii (HAw. REv. STAT. § 226-103) and
Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-2) have enacted statutes restricting foreign investment. For a further discussion of restrictive state measures, see-Cheryl Tate, Note,
The Constitutionality of State Attempts to Regulate Foreign Investment, 99 YALE L.J.
2023 (1990). As explained in that article, state restrictions are of questionable constitutionality under the Commerce Clause and the President's constitutional foreign
affairs power. Id.
13. Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170 (1988) [hereinafter Exon-Florio Amendment].
14. See Marc Greidinger, The Exon-Florio Amendment. A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 6 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111, 172 (1991) (stating that the ExonFlorio Amendment is unnecessary because other existing law provides adequate protection of national security without inviting executive agency abuse by, for example,
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der Exon-Florio, the federal government has discretion to block any
proposed investment that appears to threaten national security." Given
the discretionary nature of the Amendment, the actual impact of the law
depends greatly on the policy objectives of the administration enforcing
it. 6 Foreign investors must address both the legal and policy restrictions of Exon-Florio before acquiring or purchasing a stake in a U.S.
business.
Congress enacted Exon-Florio as Section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which amended the Defense Produc-

tion Act of 1950 by adding a Section 721.17 In implementing ExonFlorio, President Reagan established the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS or the Committee) 8 and authorized

protecting against efficient foreign competition); Alvarez, supra note 5, at 170-71
(contending that in enacting the Exon-Florio Amendment, Congress reacted to an
imaginary danger without discussing alternatives and risked compromising international
agreements and 'cooperation); see also Thomas W. Soseman, Comment, The ExonFlorio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National Security or a

Protectionist Weapon?, 15 J. CORP. L. 597, 621 (1990) (arguing that the Exon-Florio
Amendment lacks administrative standards and delegates too much decision-making
authority to executive branches, thus inviting abuse, for example, by using its powers
to defend against hostile takeovers).
15. See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 109 (summarizing the sanctions that the President can activate under the Exon-Florio Amendment to deter acqbisition of U.S.
firms).
16. See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 108-09 (noting the discretion given to the
President when obtaining concessions from foreign investors). Mr. Alvarez states that,
under the Exon-Florio Amendment, the President is not publicly accountable for the
agreements reached with foreign investors. Id. Consequently, investors generally cannot
obtain guidance from the results of presidential negotiations with other foreign investors. Id.
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1991). Section 721 was made permanent by Pub. L.
No. 102-99 (Aug. 17, 1991), and unlike the remainder of the Defense Production Act
of 1950, is not subject to expiration. Id.
18. See Interim Directive Regarding Disposition of Certain Mergers, Acquisitions,
and Takeovers, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,999 (1988), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170
(1988) (delegating to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with CFIUS, the
authority to investigate foreign investments to determine whether the President should
suspend any acquisition). President Ford previously had created CFIUS in order to
monitor the impact of foreign investment in the United States. Exec. Order No.
11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975). CFIUS originally consisted of the Secretaries of
the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce departments, as well as the Assistant to
the President for Economic Affairs and the Executive Director of the Council on
International Economic Policy. Id. At the outset, CFIUS did not have a regulatory
role. Id. Presidents have adjusted the membership of CFIUS to conform to their
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it to enforce and administer the Amendment. 9
Under the statutory provisions of Exon-Florio, CFIUS has authority to
investigate the national security effects of proposed or pending mergers,
acquisitions, or takeovers by or with foreign persons.' If a CFIUS investigation concludes that a transaction could impair national security,
the Committee may block the transaction or force divestment if the
transaction already has occurred.2 ' Foreign parties involved in U.S. acquisitions or investments, as well as CFLUS member agencies, may
request that CFIUS review whether a proposed investment is permissible
under the Exon-Florio provisions. Although the filing of a request for
review is voluntary, caution suggests that a foreign party should seriously consider filing a review request with CFIUS prior to making any
acquisition or investment if it appears the investment might fall within
the broad scope of the law. Failure to file and obtain a favorable determination in advance from CFIUS could result in subsequent delays and
disruptions to a transaction. Additionally, forced divestment may result
after a transaction is completed.
Exon-Florio establishes time limits for a CFIUS review.22 CFIUS has
30 days after it receives a request from a potential investor or a CFIUS
agency to determine whether to conduct an investigation.' If CHUS
decides" an investigation is not warranted, it will inform the parties that
it will take no further action. In the event CHUS decides to conduct an
administration's objectives. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,188. 45 Fed. Reg. 989
(1980) (assigning the responsibilities of the United States Trade Representative, including determining membership on CFIUS). President Clinton added three new members
to CFIUS. Exec. Order No. 12,860, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,201 (1993).
19. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1988) (authorizing the President to direct the
issuance of regulations to implement the Exon-Florio Amendment); 31 C.F.R. § 800
(1993) (indicating the regulations that CFIUS issued to implement the Exon-Florio
Amendment); Alan F. Holmer et al., The Final Exon-Florio Regulations on Foreign
Direct Investment: The Final Word or Prelude to Tighter Controls?, 23 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 593, 614-15 (1992) (warning that the political and economic climate in the United States may result in regulations that further increase the risks for
foreign investors).
20. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.301 (1993) (stating that the Exon-Florio regulation applies where any "foreign person" initiates an acquisition of a "United States person").
A business entity is a "United States person" for purposes of Exon-Florio protection
where the business entity is engaged in "interstate commerce in the United States.
irrespective of the nationality of the natural persons or entities which control" the,
business entity. 31 C.F.R. § 800.220 (1993).
21. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a), (c) (1988).
22. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (1988).
23. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (1988).
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investigation, it has 45 days in which to complete the investigation and
report the results to the President.24
In its investigation, CFIUS must analyze whether the investment will
result in foreign control that will impair national security.' After receiving the report, the President has 15 days to determine the appropriate course of action 26 and to report the reasons for his decision to
Congress.2 ' Thus, under the statutory timetable, a review request can
result in a delay of a proposed transaction of between 30-90 days.
2.

Review Request

CFIUS regulations require that a voluntary review request from a
foreign entity should include descriptive information regarding the nature
of the transaction, the name and address of the foreign person making
the acquisition, its parent, and the U.S. target of the acquisition, as well
as the date the transaction is to be concluded or was concluded. 8 More
importantly, the regulations also require disclosure of detailed information regarding the business activities of the U.S. entity being acquired,
such as involvement in classified contracts, security clearances, products,
or data subject to U.S. export control licenses. The regulations also
require information regarding the business of the foreign person and its
future plans for the U.S. entity, such as plans for selling, transferring, or
diminishing production and research and development. 29
Ultimately, it is incumbent upon the foreign investor to determine
whether it should seek CFIUS review before embarking on a U.S. acquisition or investment, because it is the foreign investor who will incur
the consequences of failing to do so." CFIUS can, however, initiate its
24. 50 U:S.C. app. § 2170(a) (1988).
25. 31 C.F.R. § 800.501(a) (1993).
26. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988).
27. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g) (Supp. IV 1992). Before the 1992 amendment, the
President was required to report to Congress only if the decision was to block a
transaction. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (1988).
28. 31 C.F.R. § 800.402 (1993).
29. Id.
30. See Win. Gregory Turner, Exon-Florio: The Little Statute That Could Become
a Big Headache for Foreign Investors, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 701, 717 (1991) (noting

that the foreign investor's decision regarding how much information to disclose when
voluntarily submitting to CFIUS review is difficult because it represents the sole
medium of communication between the foreign investor and CFIUS before the President decides whether to block the transaction). See generally Patrick L. Schmidt,
Exon-Florio: A Primerfor Foreign Investors and Foreign Lenders Doing Business in
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own investigation and intervene to disrupt or prohibit a transaction.3'
More significantly, if the transaction has already been completed, CFIUS
can force the foreign investor to divest.32 If CFIUS issues an order to
divest subsequent to the transaction, the foreign investor is responsible
for finding a suitable buyer.33
The foreign investor should also be aware of the potential for abuse
of Exon-Florio when considering an attempt to make a U.S. acquisition
or investment. The structure of the CFIUS review procedure provides an
incentive for the seller of a U.S. company to press for finalization of a
transaction involving foreign persons before a CFIUS review is requested or a CFIUS investigation is completed: the sellers are not liable for a
CFIUS divestment order after the deal is closed.' Foreign investors
also should recognize that, conversely, rival domestic investors or hostile
takeover targets can use an Exon-Florio request against a foreign investor's bid. At a minimum, this tactic can raise the political profile of the
matter and delay a foreign bid pending CFIUS review.35
A foreign investor considering whether to request CFIUS review must
analyze two basic issues.36 First, the foreign investor must determine
whether it will acquire control over the U.S. entity under the CFIUS
regulations. "Control" is defined broadly and nebulously as the power to

the United States, 20 INT'L Bus. LAW. 485 (1992) (providing a more detailed discussion of points of concern for foreign investors when considering the acquisition of a
U.S. company or investment).
31. See Holmer, supra note 19, at 594 (stating that the CFIUS provisions authorize the President to investigate both proposed and finalized foreign acquisitions of
American businesseS).
32. Holmer, supra note 19, at 594.
33. See Waldeck, supra note 5, at 1176 (explaining that the President may direct
the United States Attorney General to seek appropriate relief to uphold the ExonFlorio Amendment).
34. Jonathan A. Knee, Limiting Abuse of Exon-Florio by Takeover Targets, 23
G.W. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 475 (1990). Contra Stuart E. Eizenstat & Lawrence R.
Fullerton. Crying Wolf on Takeover Matters; Abuse of the Exon-Florio Provision?, 11
NAT'L L.J. 29 (1989) (stating that the members of a company resisting a hostile
takeover may attempt to cause delay and successfully cause the United States Government to intervene).
35. See supra note 34 and infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the
proposed purchase of LTV by the French company Thompson, where Thompson's domestic rivals lobbied against Thompson's proposed acquisition as a danger to U.S.
security).
36. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (defining control and how it is
acquired by a foreign investor as the foreign investor embarks upon a takeover attempt of a U.S. company).
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determine or direct "matters affecting an entity" through a majority

ownership interest or even a dominant minority of total voting shares."'
Control can be acquired by purchasing or converting voting securities of
a business, or by merger or consolidation.3 8 Moreover, control can be

acquired by entering a joint venture with a U.S. entity, if the foreign
joint venture partner would thereby acquire control of an existing business contributed by the U.S. partner.39 If the joint venture involves an
entirely new or "greenfield" business started by joint venture partners,
however, it would not be covered by the CFIUS regulations.4" Additionally, an attempt by a foreign lender to foreclose on the assets of a

U.S. entity to which it provided financing would be deemed an acquisition of control under the CFIUS regulations.4'
Second, if a foreign investor determines that it will acquire control

through its investment, it must grapple with the elusive question of
whether the investment may be viewed as impairing the "national security" of the United States-a term that neither the statute nor the regulations define.42 In analyzing the question, the foreign investor must consider the strategic significance of the type of product or technology that

37. 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (1993).
38. Lynne T. Boelringer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: An Impressive Restraint
on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 9 Wis. INT'L L.J. 413, 444-45
(1991).
39. 31 C.F.R. § 800.301(b)(5) (1991).
40. See Melvin Rishe. Foreign Ownership, Contrbl, or Influence: The Implications
for United States Companies Performing Defense Contracts, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 143,
152 (1991) (noting that a joint venture between a foreign company and a U.S. company is subject to U.S. security clearance, provided that the foreign company (1)is
not the majority shareholder in the corporation; (2) will not obstruct the U.S.
company's ability to perform classified contracts; and (3) can be excluded from access
to classified information).
41. See id. at 444 n.146 (explaining that the Code of Federal Regulations includes in its definition of control situations in which a foreign investor exercises a
degree of power over a U.S. company based on a contractual arrangement previously
established between the foreign investor and the U.S. company).
42. See Waldeck, supra note 5, at 1211 n.246 (acknowledging that paragraph (e)
of the Exon-Florio. recommends that the President consider factors such as the level
of business production needed to meet national defense requirements, the ability of
domestic companies to meet such requirements, and the extent foreign control over
U.S. businesses would impede national defense efforts when determining whether a
particular acquisition may impair national security); id. at 1184 (observing that in
1986 there was anxiety in the American political and business communities over the
proposed acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductors by a Japanese computer madufacturer
known as Fujitsu Ltd.).
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the U.S. entity produces,43 the relationship between its home country
and the United States, and whether the home country government is involved in the transaction." In this connection, the foreign investor also
should identify whether the U.S. acquisition target contracts with the
United States Government under security clearances, or provides products to the U.S. military services. 5 Further, the foreign investor should
review the market share of the U.S. entity and the other U.S. producers
in that market.4 6
Filing under Exon-Florio is voluntary, and there are no formal sanctions for neglecting to do so.47 Failure to request a review prior to an

acquisition that may involve control of a national security-sensitive
entity could, however, cause unwanted delays, interruptions, uncertainty,
and blockage or forced divestment. 48 Regardless of whether the foreign
investor decides to request CFIUS review, CFIUS member agencies can
request review of transactions on their own initiative in response to
either requests from Congress or a U.S. industry. 9 In view of the potential consequences, the foreign investor generally is obliged to accept
any costs or delays, and to request CFIUS review before completing a

43. See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) (1981) (noting that when implementing
export controls, the Secretary of Defense shall consider keystone equipment not available outside the United States that would endanger national security within the United
States if such technology were exported to other countries). See generally Gerald T.
Nowak, Above All, Do No Harm: The Application of the Exon-Florio Amendment to
Dual-Use Technologies, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1002, 1004-05 (1992) (providing discussion of the difficulty of determining the national security significance of dual-use
products).
44. Cf 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b)(1)(D) (1981) (noting that the President will
consider the relationship a foreign country currently has and the relationship that the
foreign country is likely to have in the future with the United States when determining whether the foreign country is to be removed from the list of controlled countries
for the purpose of implementing American export controls).
45. See infra Part Il.A (discussing ,that there are specific Defense Department
restrictions on foreign investment in industries involved in classified contracts, which
overlap with Exon-Florio in the area of investment in the defense industry). The
approval of the Defense Department under its regulations is a basic precondition to
Exon-Florio approval. Rische, supra note 40, at 152. The acquiring company's ability
to maintain the target company's security clearance under the Defense Department
rules has a significant impact on the permissibility on the transaction under ExonFlorio. Id.
46. Schmidt, supra note 30, at 487.
47. Schmidt, supra note 30, at 485.
48. Schmidt, supra note 30, at 485.
49. Schmidt, supra note 30, at 485.

1994]

CONTROLS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT

427

potential acquisition or investment. This action is especially expedient if,

after conducting the above analysis, it remains uncertain whether the
investment is covered by Exon-Florio." Given the vague standards of
Exon-Florio, this is most often the case.
3.

Enforcement

As the determination of what constitutes a threat to national security
is based on a subjective consideration of fairly nebulous criteria, enforcement of Exon-Florio by its very nature will depend upon the foreign investment policy of the incumbent administration.5 The application and predictability of Exon-Florio therefore will often vary from one

administration to another.52
During the relatively laissez-faire Reagan and Bush Administrations,
under which a more activist Democratic Congress passed Exon-Florio,
the law was not vigorously applied. Under these Republican administrations, the probability that a particular transaction would be investigated
after notice to CFIUS was statistically quite low.53 As of the date of
this Article, CFIUS has conducted investigations of fewer than five percent of the transactions of which it has been notified,' and of those,
the President formally has blocked only one 5 A number of other for-

50. Schmidt, supra note 30, at 485.
51. See Rick Wartzman, Keep Out: Foreign Moves to Buy U.S. Defense Firms
Face Higher Hurdles, New National Security Law Orders Tighter Scrutiny in Wake of
Thompson Case-Would Clinton be Tougher?. WALL ST. J., Nov. 2. 1992, at A6
(stating that the investment frontier within the United States is likely to become stricter with respect to foreign companies under the Clinton Administration).
52. Id.
53. See id. (noting that in 700 transactions reviewed by CFIUS, all but thirteen
were given a cursory review).
54. Id. The small portion of transactions that are investigated reflects, to some
extent, the large number of review requests filed, many for the sake of caution, as a
result of the hazy standards and high risks for not reporting. Id.
55. See Jim Mendenhall, United States Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions
Under the Exon-Florio Amendment-The MAMCO Divestiture, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
286 (1991) (discussing CFIUS's disapproval of the acquisition of MAMCO Manufacturing, an aircraft parts producer, by the Chinese company China Natural Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC)). President Bush ordered CATIC,
which had acquired MAMCO before CFIUS completed its investigation, to divest its
interest in MAMCO. Id. In ordering this complete blockage and forced divestiture, the
President gave no explanation for his decision other than a recitation of the statutory
language regarding potential impairment of national security. Id. As MAMCO manufactured only parts for commercial aircraft, the President's decision to block the trans-
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eign investors, however, have withdrawn their investment plans when
faced with potential CFIUS opposition," or when under heavy political
pressure during a CFIUS investigation."
The use of Exon-Florio to investigate and restrict foreign investment
appears to be increasing under the Clinton Administration, which seems
more willing to intervene. 8 Congress also has demonstrated a desire

action was viewed with surprise, particularly since this was the first and only occasion on which the severe measure was imposed. Id. A closer look at the circumstances involved at the time, however, suggests that the President's action may have been
a response to reports that CATIC had been seeking to acquire military airspace technology, as well as general political tensions between the United States and China. Id.
56. See Martin Tolchin, Agency on Foreign Takeovers Wielding Power, WALL ST.
J., April 24, 1989, at D6 (explaining that CFIUS was dissatisfied with terms of a
proposed acquisition by the Japanese company, Tokuyama Soda Company, of the U.S.
company, General Ceramics). General Ceramics was party to a classified contract with
the Department of Energy, pursuant to which it held a security clearance for the
production of a component for nuclear weapons. Id. In response, the parties withdrew
their notification, General Ceramics agreed to sell-off its classified Energy Department
contract, and then, upon re-notification, the transaction was not disapproved. Id.
57. See Holmer, supra note 19, at 611 (noting also that foreign buyers have
restructured deals or provided commitments due to CFIUS investigations).
58. The Administration's views on the merits of foreign investment, however, are
not uniform. See supra notes 1, 2 (revealing that some Administration officials such
as Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Tyson are outspokeni for more vigilant
scrutiny of foreign investments, while others such as Labor Secretary Reich welcome
foreign investment). Notwithstanding this apparent split, the Clinton Administration
quickly acted to apply Exon-Florio more vigorously. Id. For example, the Administration reportedly sought to change a decision made in the last days of the Bush Administration to permit the U.S. company, Applied Magnetics, to sell its optical products division to the Japanese company, Nakamichi Peripherals, Inc. Keith Bradsher,
Military Supplier's Sale Cleared, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at D3. Applied
Magnetics was the only U.S. company reportedly producing laser disk drive components for use in the guidance system of the patriot missile, among other applications.
Id. The move to reopen and reconsider a prior CFIUS approval was, up to that point,
unprecedented, requiring a finding that there is a "material discrepancy" in the information originally provided by the parties to the transaction. Id. CFIUS came under
intense Congressional criticism for inadequate consideration of national security factors
in this case, as CFIUS reportedly opted not to disapprove the transaction after the
standard 30-day review, without further investigation. Treasury Official Denies Charges
that CFIUS Review Ignored Defense Implications, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 5. 1993,
at 19. The House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer
Protection and Competitiveness, which has jurisdiction over the Exon-Florio matters,
spearheaded the attack on CFIUS. Id. A Commerce Department analysis of the CFIUS
review, contained in a confidential memorandum to the Treasury Department, stated
that the committee was unaware that Applied Magnetics was the only producer of the
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for more restrictive enforcement of Exon-Florio through amendments
passed in 1992, discussed in the following section.

4.

1992 Statutory Amendments

During the final weeks of the 102nd Congress, Senators Byrd (DW.V.) and Bingaman (D-N.M.) sponsored legislation affecting ExonFlorio as part of the Defense Authorization Bill. 9 The provisions were
designed to strengthen enforcement of Exon-Florio by limiting Presidential discretion to avoid investigating proposed foreign takeovers, and

by increasing scrutiny of foreign governments and foreign governmentowned companies.' While the provisions clearly add opportunities for
political pressure to the current process of reviewing proposed foreign
deals, 6 they will have only a nominal legal effect on the administration

of Exon-Florio.62
The Byrd Amendment63 requires a mandatory investigation of acquisitions or takeovers by a foreign government or by companies controlled
or "acting on behalf of' foreign governments, if such transaction "could

result in control" of a U.S. company involved in "activities that could
affect national security."'

The mandatory requirements of the amend-

laser disk drive components. Id. The memorandum also stated that CFIUS was unaware of the extent to which the Navy's Trident missiles and the Army's Patriot
missiles depend on these components. Id.
59. H.R. 5006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). President Bush signed this bill into
law on October 23, 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (Supp. 1993)).
60. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170a(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (stating that the provision
applies to "(A) any domestic or foreign organization or corporation that is effectively
owned or controlled by a foreign government; and (B) any individual acting on behalf
of a foreign government, as determined by the President").
61. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (Supp. IV 1992) (ensuring full disclosure of
Presidential findings to Congress); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g) (Supp. IV 1992) (mandating that the President submit to Congress reports that clearly outline the rationale
for actions taken or not taken).
62. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(i) (Supp. IV 1992) (stating that "nothing in this
section shall be construed to alter or affect any existing power, process, regulation,
investigation, enforcement measure, or review provided by any other provision of
law").
63. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (Supp. IV 1992).
64. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (Supp. IV 1992). Proposed implementing regulations
were published on February 16, 1994. These regulations would define a "foreign
government" broadly to include any government body exercising governmental functions, such as state and local authorities. See 31 C.F.R. § 800, 210; 59 Fed. Reg.
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ment, however, are conditioned on what amounts to a discretionary
finding by CFIUS that national security could be affected by the transaction, that the subject U.S. company would be under foreign "control,"
and possibly, that a foreign company was "acting on behalf of' a foreign government.65 Thus, despite the mandatory language, investigatory
discretion still rests with CFIUS.
Even in the absence of the amendment, CFIUS almost certainly would
conduct an investigation if it concluded that a transaction with a foreign
company, at least one that was government-owned or controlled, "could
affect national security." Moreover, while the amendment requires that
an investigation is mandatory upon such a finding, it is not mandatory
for the parties involved in the underlying transaction to notify CFIUS,
potentially undercutting any "mandatory" effect.' The Byrd Amendment also requires CFIUS to consider in its review a number of specified factors, but each of these should logically be, and reportedly are,
part of a CFIUS review in any event.67
The Byrd Amendment thus is of dubious legal consequence, although
its political effect may prove more significant. It sends a clear message
to CFIUS that Congress will carefully review its consideration of proposed investments involving foreign government-owned entities. The
most significant change in the Byrd Amendment requires the President
to report to Congress at the conclusion of all investigations, including

7,666 (1994). However, the regulations also specify that a mandatory investigation
would not be required where the foreign government entity was merely a "passive
participant in an acquisition by a foreign person." Id.
65. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (defining the scope of mandatory investigations). While the standard for mandatory review of foreign government
acquisitions-those which "could affect" national security-is technically lower than
the general standard of review for transactions which "threaten to impair" national
security, it appears the practical effect of this theoretical distinction will prove negligible. Similarly, while it is possible that CFIUS could seek to broaden application of
the amendment by liberally interpreting what constitutes a foreign company "acting on
behalf of" or controlled by a foreign government, this ultimately is a matter for
CFIUS's discretion; CFIUS's original authority already permitted it to scrutinize and
limit access of such companies if it desired to do so. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(i)
(Supp. IV 1992).
66. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (Supp. IV 1992).
67. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (Supp. IV 1992) (setting forth the statutory
factors which include U.S. national security production requirements, U.S. domestic
production capacity, and the effects of foreign control). The Treasury Department determined that these factors were "straightforward" in the statute and did not require
implementing regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 7,666 (1994).
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those in which a proposed transaction is approved, adding to the process
an opportunity for Congress to exert political pressure for more vigorous, stricter enforcement."8 The statutory enumeration of factors for
consideration also adds political weight to the specified criteria, and
makes it more likely that the factors will be considered carefully.69
Additional measures set forth in the Bingaman legislation of the Defense Authorization Act of 199270 prohibit foreign government-owned
companies from purchasing U.S. defense contractors that are engaged in
contracts requiring access to certain proscribed categories of information,
or that are involved in contracts valued at more than $500 million with
the Defense or Energy Departments." While technically not an amendment to Exon-Florio, the Bingaman legislation contains an exception
which provides that the prohibition does not apply if Exon-Florio is not
invoked to prevent the transaction. 2 The Bingaman provision arguably
is susceptible to two interpretations: (1) the transaction is permissible
unless CFIUS prohibits it; or (2) the transaction is not permitted unless
CFIUS allows it. The first interpretation renders the provision tautological and meaningless: if Exon-Florio is invoked to prevent the investment, a separate provision prohibiting the purchase would be redundant.
Even under the second interpretation, however, the Bingaman legislation
is of questionable effect, because the transaction would be subject to
Defense Department controls and almost certainly would be reported to

68. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g) (Supp. IV 1992). While previously the President
only needed to report decisions to block an investment, CFIUS now must keep in
mind that all of its decisions could face Congressional scrutiny. The Treasury Department determined that these statutory reporting requirements also did not require implementing regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 7,666 (1994).
69. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f)(4) (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring the President to
consider potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of military
goods, equipment, or technology to any country identified by the Secretary of State to
support terrorism, missile proliferation or the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons under the Export Administration Act or any country listed on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation-Special Country List). The Byrd Amendment also requires the President to consider potential national security ramifications of the proposed or pending
transaction on international technological leadership by the United States. 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2170(f)(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
70. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
71. 50 U.S.C app. § 2170(a) (Supp. IV 1992). To increase sensitivity to "high
tech" issues, the White House Assistants for National Security and Economic Policy,
as well as the Office of Science and Technology Policy, were added to CFIUS to
assist in such reviews. Id.
72. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
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and reviewed by CFIUS, regardless of the legislation.
B.

PREMERGER NOTIFICATION UNDER HART-SCOTr-RODINO

Another general investment control is the premerger notification and
waiting period requirement enacted in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976."3 Unlike the Exon-Florio provisions, which
focus exclusively on foreign investors for national security reasons, these
general antitrust requirements apply to domestic as well as foreign concerns. 4 Foreign companies seeking to invest in the United States nevertheless must face these statutory requirements and restrictions, which
allow U.S. authorities the opportunity to analyze the effect of a proposed foreign investment.
Title II of the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
added a provision to the Clayton Act, Section 7A.75 Section 7A imposes notification and waiting period requirements on firms planning
certain mergers and acquisitions. 6 Under the authority of Section 7A,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgated regulations implementing the premerger notification and waiting period requirements of
the law.77
Section 7A requires that, for certain large transactions, both the acquiring persons and acquired person must file notice with the FTC and
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,78 and observe a
specific waiting period79 before consummating a transaction. The pur-

73. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1988) (mandating that the provision is applicable to
all persons).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
77. 16 C.F.R. §§ 800-803 (1993). See 16 C.F.R. § 803 app. (1993) (examining
the Premerger Notification and Report Form).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1) (1988). With certain exceptions, the term "person" is
very broadly defined to include the "ultimate parent entity and all entities which it
controls directly or indirectly." 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(1) (1993). Because an "ultimate
parent" is an entity that is not controlled by another, the reporting requirement goes
not only to the parties directly acquiring and being acquired, but also to the parents
of such parties. Id.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b), (e) (1988). Although the initial waiting period varies
with the nature of the acquisition, the waiting period generally is 30 days following
the acquiring person's filing, but for cash tender offers, the period is 15 days from
the filing date. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(B) (1988). This period may be extended should
either agency request additional information regarding the proposed acquisition. 15
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pose of the statute is to enhance the United States Government's capability for preventative enforcement under the Clayton Act by providing
the antitrust enforcement agencies, such as the FTC and the Justice
Department, with sufficient time for advanced screening of substantial
acquisitions." During the waiting period, the enforcement agencies may
act to prohibit a proposed acquisition. Compliance with the requirements
of Section 7A does not, however, mean that the transaction is permissible under the antitrust laws, nor does it prevent future challenges to
the transaction." Accordingly, foreign investors should carefully. analyze
the substantive provisions of all applicable antitrust laws prior to proceeding with an acquisition in the United States.
Acquisitions covered by Section 7A include mergers, consolidations,
purchases of business assets, newly formed joint ventures, and conversions of non-voting securities into voting securities (although purchases
of convertible non-voting securities are not covered).82 Significantly,
Section 7A requirements apply only if the entities involved in the transaction, and the acquisition itself, are of sufficient size. Thus, Section 7A
applies only if two threshold requirements are satisfied: (1) size of the
parties; and (2) size of the acquisition.
Regarding the size of the parties, the acquisition need only be reported if it involves: "an acquired person engaged in manufacturing and
having annual net sales or total assets of at least $10 million (or not
engaged in manufacturing and having total assets of at least $10 million)
and an acquiring person with total assets or annual net sales of at least
$100 million;" or "an acquired person with total assets or net sales of
$100 million, and an acquiring person with total assets or annual net

U.S.C. § 18a(e) (1988).
80. See also 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1988) (stating that information submitted to the
FTC and Justice Department pursuant to Section 7A is exempt from the Freedom of
Information Act and may not be made public, unless deemed relevant to an administrative or judicial proceeding). The federal enforcement agencies are authorized to
provide this information to Congress, although courts have ruled that they may not
provide the information to state antitrust enforcement agencies. Liebermann v. FTC,
771 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1985); Mattox v. FTC, 752 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1985).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(i) (1988).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a), (c) (1988). See infra Part II.A (stating that acquisitions
in the defense industry are particularly vulnerable to antitrust problems, given the
limited competition in this area). See generally FTC v. PPG Indus. Inc., 798 F.2d
1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the evidence showed that the proposed acquisition
would be harmful enough to competition to forbid the acquisition under the Clayton
Act).
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sales of at least $10 million."83
Regarding the size of the acquisition, the acquisition need only be
reported if it would result in the acquiring person's holding "at least
15% of the voting securities or assets of the acquired person" or "an
aggregate total amount of voting securities and assets of the acquired
person in excess of $15 million."'84
The statute and regulations set forth complex rules for measuring or
valuing the assets and sales of the participating persons, and the holdings, securities and assets involved in the acquisition. These rules must
be carefully reviewed before determining whether the premerger notification requirements apply.
There are a number of exceptions to the premerger notification requirements of Section 7A. Certain exceptions apply only to acquisitions
by "foreign persons,"85 in cases in which the acquisition involves: (1)
assets located outside the United States;86 (2) U.S.' assets that total less
than $15 million; 7 (3) voting stock of a foreign issuer if such stock
would not confer control over either an issuer holding assets of $15
million or more located in the United States, or a U.S. issuer with annual net sales or total assets of $25 million; 88 or (4) an acquisition where
the acquired person is also foreign and the combined aggregate U.S.
annual sales and the aggregate U.S.-located assets, of both the acquiring
and acquired persons, are less than $110 million.89 Other exceptions
apply to both domestic and foreign companies and exempt intra-person
transactions, such as mergers between subsidiaries of the same parent,
and the formation of new wholly-owned subsidiaries.9'

83. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1988).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3) (1988). In addition, subsequent acquisitions will be
reportable if they would result in the acquiring person's crossing one of the specified
higher thresholds and if they do not qualify for an exemption. 16 C.F.R. § 801.20
(1993).
85. See 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(e)(2)(i)(A) (1993) (defining "foreign persons" as a person whose ultimate parent is not incorporated in the United States, is not organized
under the laws of the United States, and does not have its principal offices with the
United States).
86. 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(a) (1993).
87. See 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(c) (1993) (noting that the $15 million limit here and
in other exceptions does not include "investment assets." which are defined as cash.
deposits in financial institutions, and instruments evidencing government obligations).
88. 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(b)(l)-(2) (1993).
89. 16 C.F.R. § 802.51(d) (1993).
90. See 16 C.F.R. § 802.30 (1993) (stating that an acquisition in which, by reason of holdings of voting securities, the acquiring and acquired persons are the same
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Where disclosure is not exempted, compliance is mandatory and is
enforced by sanctions. Specifically, if a potential foreign or domestic
investor does not observe the premerger notification and waiting period
requirement, under Section 7A, and jurisdiction can be established over
the foreign investor, it is subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 per
day and an injunction on the acquisition pending compliance.9'
While the Section 7A requirements do not target or impose special
restrictions on foreign companies, foreign investors nevertheless must be
aware of and comply with these requirements before going forward with
a planned acquisition. In determining whether a particular transaction is
covered by Section 7A, foreign investors should carefully analyze the
applicability of exemptions, particularly those discussed above, that are
available only to the foreign investors. A particular concern for foreign
investors is that, while the information they submit is largely exempt
from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), it
nevertheless may be disclosed to Congress, which has taken a' keen
interest in foreign acquisitions.
II. RESTRICTIONS IN SPECIFIC AREAS
The United States also maintains legal restrictions on foreign investment and operations in Various economic sectors. The strictness of and
limits and exceptions to these controls vary depending on the sector and
statute involved. Foreign companies must ensure that they are aware of
and comply with these specific controls before deciding whether to go
forward with an investment. The consequences of noncompliance with
these prohibitions are severe. Most commonly, the investor can be
forced to divest or discontinue operations, although fines and other
penalties can apply in certain cases.
A.

GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT

1. Investments in Defense-Related Sectors
The Defense Industrial Security Program of the U.S. Department of
Defense sets forth indirect restrictions on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense industry through limits on access to sensitive government pro-

person, shall be exempt from the requirements of the act).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g) (1988) (implying that these penalties apply even if
the acquisition otherwise meets the substantive requirements of the antitrust laws).
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jects. Foreign companies investing in the defense industry must explore
the possible effects of this program or risk the loss of the acquired
company's security clearance. In the defense industry, a security clearance generally is vital to participation in contracts with the government,
which is the essential defense industry customer, and hence an acquired
company's loss of the clearance can render the acquisition untenable and
force divestment.9"
In addition to these defense industrial security restrictions, foreign
investors also must analyze whether the U.S. company in which they
wish to invest deals in the types of technology controlled by the Departments of State93 or Commerce.' If so, foreign investors must determine whether they will be permitted access to the technology, or, if
they need the technology, whether they could structure the transaction in
a manner to avoid transfer of the technology.95 In this context, a prospective foreign investor's compliance with the export controls of its
own nation can effect the determination whether it will be permitted to
invest.
Under the Defense Industrial Security Program, companies that are
subject to foreign ownership, control or influence, commonly referred to
as companies under "FOCI", generally have difficulty obtaining the
security clearance necessary to participate in the large and lucrative field
of classified United States Government contracts.96
Under the National Security Act of 1947, 9' the Defense Department
is authorized to restrict the release of classified information to private

92. See Rishe, supra note 40, at 144-45 (explaining that foreign investments in
U.S. companies may inhibit the companies' ability to perform classified defense contracts and may have a negative effect on the revenues these contracts generate if the
companies do not obtain a security clearance).
93. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (1993) (stating that through the International Traffic in
Arms Regulation, the State Department's Office of Defense Controls administers restrictions on defense goods and technology).
94. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 768 (1993) (stating that
the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration controls dual-use technology).
95. See generally Wartzman, supra note 51, at Al (discussing Thomson CSF
S.A., a French company, and its violations of multinational export controls). These
violations were used in a successful effort to prevent Thomson from purchasing LTV,
a U.S. defense-related company. Id.
96. See Rishe, supra note 40, at 144-45 (discussing foreign investment in the
United States and how these foreign connections can inhibit a U'S. company's ability
to perform classified defense contracts).
97. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
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industry. Pursuant to this authority and that of a 1960 Executive Order,98 the Defense Department promulgated the Industrial Security Manual (ISM), and the Industrial Security Regulation (ISR),9 which comprise the Defense Industrial Security Program, and set forth the policy,
procedures, and requirements for obtaining classified data."°°
Before obtaining access to classified information, a contractor must
establish its need for the information, usually claiming a connection with
performance of a classified government contract, and must obtain a
facility security clearance and a personal security clearance. A facility
security clearance (FCL) generally permits a specific location or part of
a contractor's organization to receive specified classified information."'
In order to obtain an FCL, a contractor must complete and submit forms
in which it agrees to implement certain security measures and disclose
information on foreign affiliations. 2 The contractor must promptly notify the Defense Department in the event of any chaige in the conditions of the contractor. In parent-subsidiary relationships, the parent, as
well as the subsidiary, must qualify for an FCL to the same level of
classified information, unless special arrangements are made with the

98. See Executive Order No. 10865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1,583 (1960) (authorizing the
Defense Department to safeguard classified information and to enter into arrangements
to protect the classified information of other agencies including the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, Labor, State, Treasury and Transportation, as well as
the General Services Administration, and the U.S. Information Agency). But see generally 48 C.F.R. § 904.700 (1992) (authorizing the Department of Energy to procure
its own systems for protecting classified information); 32 C.F.R. § 1902.13 (1993)
(authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency to establish its own system for protecting
classified information).
99. These rules, which were issued by Defense Department directives 5220.22-M
(1989) and 5220.22-R (1985), are not published. The rules are administered by the
Defense Investigative Service.
100. See Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), 48 C.F.R. § 52.204-2 (1992) (requiring contractors seeking access to classified information to certify that they will
enter security arrangements in compliance with the industrial security rules, including
the Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information and any revisions to that manual).
101. See Rishe, supra note 40, at 149-50 (claiming-that a facility security clearance (FCL) represents an administrative determination that a specific location of a
contractor's organization is eligible for access to certain categories of classified information).
102. See supra note 97 (requiring' the contractor's certification that it will implement security controls -through Defense Department Form 441, the "Department of
Defense Security Agreement" and also requiring information concerning foreign affiliations through Form 4415, the "Certificate Pertaining to Foreign Interests").
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Defense Department.0 3
Second, a personal security clearance (PSC) must be obtained for the
owners, officers, directors and executive personnel of a corporation, as
well as all personnel who will have access to the classified information."' 4 Foreign nationals generally are not eligible for a PSC.05
Companies under FOCI generally are not eligible for a security clearance. The Defense Department determines whether FOCI exists on a
case-by-case basis, based on information submitted to the Defense Department by the contractor. In conducting this analysis, the Defense
Department will consider whether the foreign ownership constitutes five
percent or more of the corporate securities, whether the foreign ownership can designate representatives as corporate directors or officers or
otherwise influence such parties, and whether there are interlocking
directors with foreign entities."
There are ways, however, in which a contractor designated as being
under FOCI can be granted access to classified information through
corporate insulation arrangements or bilateral government agreements.
These measures must be adopted and implemented in coordination with
the Defense ° Department, and their acceptability is determined by the
Department."
In terms of insulation measures, the board of directors of a U.S. firm
subject to FOCI may be required to issue a resolution' certifying that
the foreign interests will have no access to the classified information, or

103. Rishe, supra note 40, at 154.
104. See id. at 157 (holding that a personnel security clearance (PSC) entitles an
individual to have access to classified information pursuant to the terms of the PSC).
One of the prerequisites for obtaining an FCL is that owners, officers, directors, and
executive personnel must be covered by a PSC. Id.
105. See id. at 151 (discussing the circumstances when a Representative of a
Foreign Interest (RFI) is not eligible for a PSC).
106. Industrial Security Regulation
2-202.
107. See Rishe, supra note 40, at 176 (explaining that in some cases the Defense
Departments permits a contractor subject to FOCI to operate under an Interim Security Agreement, which creates an agreement to allow the parties time to put in place
the final arrangements for the company's FCL and to allow it time to implement
insulation arrangements or bilateral government agreements).
108. See Rishe, supra note 40, at 168 (stating that for a board resolution to be
acceptable to the DOD as eliminating FOCI concerns, the corporate structure must
support the claims of the resolution, in that the major corporate officers and the
board chairman are U.S. citizens, and the majority of the company's stock is held by
U.S. entities. Id.
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influence on the performance bf the contract.'" A standard voting trust
agreement".. or proxy agreement"' may also be executed to insulate
the U.S. company, whereby the foreign shareholder transfers the stock to
independent U.S. citizens who act as voting trustees or proxy holders,
thereby eliminating the foreign shareholder's influence on the management of the corporation." 2
United States affiliates of foreign companies also may be eligible for
access to classified information under reciprocal industrial security agreements between the United States and the country of the foreign company. Reciprocal clearance arrangements may occur where classified information is already available to the foreign government,- or, in rarer circumstances, where the Defense Department decides that the company is
eligible for a special security arrangement." 3
In summary, under the Defense Industrial Security Program, foreign
companies and their wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries generally are prohibited from obtaining security clearances to classified information."'
Moreover, if a foreign company acquires a partial interest in a U.S.

defense contractor with an existing security clearance, it may significantly impede or prevent the U.S. company from performing under the classified contract, but only if the Exon-Florio provisions are met. "'
Therefore, the foreign investor must first examine the impact of its
acquisition on a U.S. company's security clearance and explore possible

109. Rishe, supra note 40, at 167-68.
110. Rishe, supra note 40, at 167 (defining a voting trust agreement as an agreement that seeks to eliminate the possibility of foreign interests gaining access to classified information or being in a position to affect the performance of classified contracts).
111. See Rishe, supra note 40, at 172 (noting that in proxy agreements, the voting
rights of stock owned by the foreign interests are conveyed to the proxy holders
through the irrevocable proxy agreements).
112. Rishe, supra note 40. See ISR I 2-205.b. 2-205.c (showing that the major
distinctions between these two alternatives is that a voting trust involves transfer of
legal title in the shares while the irrevocable proxy agreement does not).
113. See Rishe, supra note 40, at 172-73 (noting that these agreements also provide that foreign nationals of these foreign companies may receive a U.S. security
clearance if they hold positions in the U.S. subsidiary).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1988) (pro ,iding that the release of such classified
information to unauthorized persons is a crime punishable by a fine of $10,000 or
imprisonment for up to ten years). The Act does not, however, set forth penalties for
receipt of such information. Id.
115. See Holmer, supra note 19, at 594 (commenting on the Exon-Florio provisions that regulate certain foreign direct investment in the United States).
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arrangements that may avoid impairment of the clearance. Proceeding
with an investment before conducting such an analysis could result in
suspension or revocation of the U.S. company's clearance and could bar
further classified contract activity, potentially undermining the purpose
of the investment.
In addition to these defense-related procurement rules, the general
federal procurement process operates to limit foreign investment and
operations, as is discussed in the next section.
2. United States Government Procurement Generally
The U.S. procurement market in general is enormous and lucrative," 6 and for many companies the United States Government is an
important, or even the primary or exclusive, customer."7 The United
States Government has a strong preference for domestically produced
products over foreign ones, as mandated by the Buy American Act,"'
and these preferences can impede foreign investment in certain circumstances." 9 Under the Buy American Act rules, United States Government entities must give priority to products from the United States, for

116. According to statistics from the General Service Administration Federal Procurement Database Report, the United States Government purchased over $210 billion
worth of goods and services in 1991, of which only $6 billion worth were supplied
by foreign contractors. Although, as noted earlier, this Article is concerned with federal laws and restrictions, it should be noted that there are also significant restrictions
on procurement of foreign products by state and local governments.
117. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2330 (1988) (showing that United States Government
procurement is governed by the Armed Forces Procurement Act). The act governs
procurement by the Department of Defense, the Military Services, the Coast Guard,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Id. The Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 governs civilian procurement. 41 U.S.C. § 251.
118. Buy American Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § lOa-10d (Supp. 1992), implemented
by regulations set forth at 48 C.F.R. § 25.100-205.
119. See 48 C.F.R. § 25.105(a)-(c) (1992) (implementing these preferences by
requiring that a price differential be added to contract offers involving a foreign produwt, which generally is 6-12% for non-defense procurement); Memorandum from John
R. Luckey, Legislative Attorney, to House Committee on Government Operations 2
(June 16, 1989), reprinted in Implementation of International Government Procurement
Agreements and the Buy American Act of 1988: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 85 (1989) (stating that a 50% differential exists for defense
procurement, excluding exempted duties); 48 C.F.R. §§ 25.105, 225.105 (1992) (imposing restrictions on procurement of foreign goods pursuant to the Balance of Payments Program, which applies to procurement outside the United States).
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which the cost of the U.S. materials or components comprises at least
50% of the total cost. 2 ' Despite being subject to significant exceptions
and waivers,' the Buy American Act restrictions apply to a large por-

tion of government contracts.'
The procurement preferences of the Buy American Act indirectly
affect foreign investment by imposing what amounts to a domestic content requirement. Where the foreign investor seeks to establish a U.S.
production or assembly facility that sources parts and components from
overseas suppliers, these requirements may mean that the finished products would not be of U.S. origin. Because there are often important eco-

nomic incentives to sourcing parts and components from overseas parent
companies, the Buy American Act can be a deterrent to foreign invest-

120. See 48 C.F.R. § 25.101, 25.108 (1992) (specifying the scope of what is defined as a domestic product).
121. See 41 U.S.C. § 10a (Supp. 1992) (enumerating Buy American- Act exceptions to the mandated preferences where U.S. products are found to be unavailable
and where 'application of restrictions would be unreasonably costly or contrary to the
public interest). Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2518 (1988) (setting forth a significant exception that allows the United States Trade Representative to
waive Buy American Act restrictions with regard to contracts covered by the Government Procurement Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 19 U.S.C.
§ 2511-2518 (1988) (applying the waiver power to contracts with foreign countries
that are signatories to the GATT Procurement Code and involve U.S. products and
suppliers). The GATT Procurement Code applies to contracts over a threshold value
level, currently $176,000, where the foreign contractor is from a country that is a
signatory to the GATT Procuremept Code, and where the U.S. agency and products
involved are enumerated in the Code. 48 C.F.R. § 25.400 (1992).
122. See 22 U.S.C. § 2350(b) (1988) (providing that restrictions for military products may be waived pursuant to bilateral defense agreements such as Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs)); 48 C.F.R. § 225.801; 870 (1992) (stating that restrictions for
military products may be waived pursuant to bilateral defense agreements such as
Memoranda of Understanding); 48 C.F.R. § 25.403(e)-(f) (1992) (stating that the waivers are not applicable to service, construction, or research and development contracts);
48 C.F.R. § 25.406 (1992) (providing that the waivers are not applicable to all United States Government agencies, such as the Departments of Transportation and Energy). Under a 1988 amendment to the Buy American Act, procurement from countries
that are listed as discriminating against U.S. sales are prohibited pursuant to the enforcement provisions of Title III of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act. 41 U.S.C. §
lOb-l(a); 19 U.S.C. § 2515 (1988). Moreover. to encourage countries to join the
GATT Procurement Code, the Trade Agreements Act bans procurement of products
that otherwise would be covered by the GATT Procurement Code from any country
that is not designated by the United States Trade Representative as being a signatory
to the GATT Procurement Code. 19 U.S.C. § 2512(a) (1988). See 48 C.F.R. § 25.401
(1992) (setting forth these designated countries).
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ment in the United States, particularly where the federal government is a
significant or primary element of the market. At minimum, it could
restrict the way in which the foreign entity may do business.
The recent trend to impose harsher penalties on companies that violate
the Buy American Act exacerbates the deterrent effect of the act's requirements.'23 In order to contract with the United States Government,
companies must ensure that they fully comply with all Buy American
Act restrictions and certify to that effect. 24 Companies can incur penalties for improper or erroneous certifications regarding the U.S. content
of the merchandise sold." The standard penalty for violations of the
Buy American Act in prior practice was a debarment or suspension of
contractors for a set period of time, generally three years. 126 In the
past several years, the Buy American Act has increasingly been enforced
under the False Claims Act, 27 which provides for civil penalties of up
to three times the damages caused, plus $10,000 for each false
claim,22 and criminal penalties consisting of fines and up to five years
imprisonment. 29 A private person, such as a competitor who has
knowledge of a false claim, can initiate a civil false claims action. 3

123. See William H. Lash, III, Warning! Buy American or Else, J. CoM., Nov. 25,
1992, at A6 (observing the trend of more Buy American Act requirements).
124. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 25.109, 52.225-1 (1992) setting forth provisions in solicitations and clauses added to contracts that require contractors to certify that they are
supplying only domestic end products); 48 C.F.R. § 52.225-3 (1992) (requiring at
least 50% of the cost of components to be U.S. parts).
125. See Lash, supra note 123, at A6 (reporting the high penalties faced by companies that violate the Buy American Act).
126. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.4 (1992) (providing for disbarment or suspension among
the penalties for errant contractors); Lash. supra note 123, at A6 (reporting that the
standard practice is to suspend the contractor for three years).
127. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729-33 (1988). See United States v. Rule
Industries, 878 F.2d. 535, 537-30 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that a contractor had
knowingly falsely certified that it was supplying domestic saw blades which had been
imported and further processed in the United States, but not to the point of comprising over half of the value of the end product). The company was fined in excess of
$600,000 under the False Claims Act. Id.
128. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988). Moreover, the Small Business Act provides specific
penalties for contractors who knowingly misrepresent their status as "small business"
or minority contractors, including fines of up to $500,000 and imprisonment of up to
10 years. 15 U.S.C. § 645(d) (1988).
130. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1988) (providing that where the government proceeds under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1988), the plaintiff may be awarded 15-25% of
the fine or recovery, in most circumstances); see also United States ex rel. Pedicone
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Thus, while the Buy American Act does not explicitly restrict foreign
investment, the strong preferences for U.S. goods mandated by the act,
and the harsh penalties for its violation, discourage foreign investment,
and limit the operations of entifies where federal procurement is an

important part of business.
B.

COMMUNICATIONS

Foreign companies seeking to invest in the U.S. communications
industry are faced with legal obstacles set forth by the Communications
Act of 1934.1'' The Communications Act contains several prohibitions
on the foreign operation, ownership, or control of wireless communications facilities in the United States, and also regulates the entry and interconnection of domestic and international communications common
carriers.'
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the
agency authorized to adrinister the law and regulations.' The FCC
has substantial discretion over whether to bar foreign ownership in the
communications field." This authority differs from the discretionary
restraints administered by other agencies where the President ultimately
decides Whether to block an investment. 35
The Communications Act provides that no broadcast or common
carrier license may be granted to or held by any alien individual or
foreign corporation 36 if the FCC finds that refusal to grant or revoca-

v. Mazak Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ohio 1992), (involving a former employee
of a foreign-owned U.S. company who filed a suit alleging a violation of the Buy
American Act). The defendant, Mazak Corp., was fined $2.3 million, of which
$717,000 was paid to the former employee. Id.
131. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The U.S. communications industry includes wireless and wire communications, whether broadcast or common carrier.
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-153 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
132. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-53 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
133. 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1992).
134. 47 C.F.R. § 310 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
135. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1991) (authorizing the administering agency to determine the acceptability of a foreign investment) with supra
notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary restrictions on foreign
investment in other areas where Presidential approval generally is required).
136. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1988) (giving a broad definition of "foreign corporation" that includes not only those organized in a foreign country but also: 1) corporations in which any officer or director is an alien; 2) corporations in which aliens or
their representatives hold more than one fifth of the capital stock; and 2) corporations
controlled directly or indirectly by another corporation of which any officer or one
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tion of the license will serve the public interest.'37 Foreign investors
must be mindful of this provision not only when investing in U.S. communications companies, but also when acquiring an interest in a diversified U.S. corporation that does not operate in the communications industry, but that may have some holdings in common carriers; the FCC
could force the acquiror to divest such holdings. 3 The Communications Act also sets forth the express prohibition that no station license of
any kind may be granted to or held by a foreign government.'39
The Communications Act sets forth other requirements on wireless
communications so that only persons who are legally eligible for employment in the United States may operate a radio or television station.'" Certain communications common carriers engage only in wire
communications, however, and federal law does not prescribe explicit
citizenship requirements for these communications carriers.'
Foreign investors also are restricted from wireless satellite communications under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962,142 which established a satellite communications system for servicing the United
States.' Under authority of the act, the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) was established to administer this satellite communications system.'" Although COMSAT is a private corporation, it
is subject to federal regulation by the Communications Satellite Act, and
foreign ownership of shares in the corporation is limited to 20%.'" 5
C.

TRANSPORTATION

Investment by foreign companies in U.S. air and maritime transport is
significantly restricted, as discussed in the following sections.

fourth of the directors are aliens, or aliens own one fourth of the capital stock).
137. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1988).
138. See Briefly, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1990, at D2 (stating that under 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b) (1988), MCA Studios was required to sell its New Jersey-based television
station after Matsushita acquired MCA).
139. 47 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1988).
140. 47 U.S.C. § 303(1)(1) (1988). But cf 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1992) (allowing alien
ownership of cable television systems).
141. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1988).
142. 47 U.S.C §§ 701-757 (1988).
143. Id.
144. 47 U.S.C. § 731 (1988). See 31 C.F.R. § 25.501 (1993) (regulating COMSAT).
145. 47 U.S.C. § 734(d) (1988).
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1. Aviation

a. Operations
Foreign participation in the heavily regulated U.S. air transportation

industry is subject to substantial restrictions, under authority of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,46 as implemented by regulations promulgated by the Office of Aviation Analysis of the Department of Transportation. 47 Under the Federal Aviation Act, foreign airlines are flatly

prohibited from operating in U.S. domestic air service. 4 Domestic airline operations are limited to aircraft registered in the United States, for
which only a U.S. citizen'49 or a corporation organized in the United
States 50 with aircraft based and used primarily in the United States,

may register.
Non-United States persons may engage in international air transportation serving U.S. and foreign destinations, but they must operate as

"foreign air carriers"''

and must acquire a permit from the Department

Transportation.'52

of
The Department of Transportation's regulations set
forth the requirements for permit applications'53 and the terms, condi-

146. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1988).
147. 14 C.F.R. §§ 211-298 (1992).
148. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1988). Domestic operations are those between destinations in United States territory. Id. There are exceptions to the prohibition on domestic service in emergency situations. 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(7).
149. 49 U.S.C. § 1401(a)-(b) (1988). A corporation is a U.S. citizen if it is incorporated in the United States; if at least 75% of the voting interest and 51% of the
equity is owned or controlled by U.S. citizens; and at least two-thirds of the directors
and other managing officers of the corporation are U.S. citizens. 49 U.S.C. §
1301(16) (1988). If the carrier is owned by an individual, or individuals, or a partnership, all the individuals or entities involved must be U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens. Id.
150. 49 U.S.C. § 1041(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988). Non-U.S. citizens incorporated in the
United States can do business if their fleet is "based and primarily used in the United States." Id.
151. See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(22), (24) (1988) (defining a "foreign air carrier" as a
person who is not a citizen of the Ufiited States, who carries persons or property between the United States and places outside the United States, for compensation).
152. 49 U.S.C. §1372(a) (1988). See 49 U.S.C. § 1508(b) (1988) (allowing foreign
aircraft to navigate in United States sovereign territory if authorized by Transportation
Department regulations (i.e., with permit)). International air service is deemed to be
between a United States and foreign destination. Id.
153. 14 C.F.R. § 211 (1992).
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tions and limitations of foreign air carrier permits. 54
b.

Investment

Notwithstanding the restrictions on operations by foreign carriers,
foreign companies may invest in U.S. airlines, but only to the extent
that the recipient U.S. airline would remain a U.S. citizen under the
tight limitations of the Federal Aviation Act, which requires that no
more than 25% of the voting stock, and 49% of the total equity be held
by foreign investors. 55 Moreover, investments below this statutory
threshold are also subject to review by the Department of Transportation
if the foreign investor is an air carrier that
would operate jointly with
56
the U.S. airline in which it had invested.
These federal restrictions on direct investment received significant
attention in 1992-93, a time of turmoil for the U.S. airline industry that
was characterized by large losses, bankruptcies and restructuring'5 7
when several financially troubled airlines sought investment from foreign
airlines,'58 and certain investment offers were withdrawn because of the
regulations." 9 A key factor in Transportation Department approval of
such investments is the reciprocal access accorded to U.S. airlines by
the government of the investing company."6 Threshold levels for in154. Id. § 213.
155. See supra note 149 (discussing the limitations set forth in 49 U.S.C. §
1301(16) (1988)).
156. See 14 C.F.R. § 399.88 (1992) (regulating designator code sharing, the practice of combining connecting flights under the same booking code).
157. See Richard M. Weintraub, Rebuilding US Air; Investment by British Airways
Gives Carrier a Big Lift, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1993, at F1 (reporting that in 1992,
two U.S. companies. Eastern Airlines and Pan Am, went bankrupt; TWA and Continental barely survived; and the largest three U.S. airlines-American, Delta, and
United-all experienced significant losses).
'
158. See Martha M. Hamilton, Northwest-KLM Deal Tentatively Approved; Airlines
Sought Antitrust Law Immunity to Integrate Operations, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1992,
at B1 (indicating that Northwest Airlines formed an alliance with KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines in a search for capital and expanded routes); Martin Tolchin, U.S. Gives
Britain a Warning in Approving USAir Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at Dl (announcing the Department of Transportation's approval of a British Airway's proposal
to invest $300 million in USAir).
159. See British Air Drops Bid to Acquire 44 Percent Stake in Troubled USAir,
1992 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 247, at D-3 (Dec. 23, 1992) (stating that
British Airways withdrew its bid to acquire 44% of USAir's equity and 21% of
USAir's voting rights because the Department of Transportation was likely to reject
the bid).
160. See id. at D-3 (quoting then-Secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card, Jr., as
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vestment have remained controversial, as some in the United States have
called for increasing the level at which foreigners may invest, 6 ' while
others have called for a moratorium on foreign investment in the air-

lines. 62 A General Accounting Office study, published on January 10,
1993, states that relaxing the limitations on foreign investment in U.S.
airlines would provide needed funds for debt-ridden U.S. airlines, but
would not preserve competition in the industry. 63
While the operations and direct investments by foreign carriers are
restricted, certain indirect investments by foreign-owned U.S. companies
in the U.S. airline industry are not. Foreign-owned U.S. corporations

may own U.S. aircraft and operate in U.S. domestic air service if the
corporation is organized in the United States and if its aircraft are based
and used in the United States."6 By using such an approach, foreign-

ers may indirectly operate in the U.S. air service market via formation
of a domestic airline subsidiary or through acquisition of control over an

saying that the British Airways-USAir proposal would have been approved had the
British market been more open to U.S. carriers); Hamilton, supra note 158, at BI
(suggesting that an agreement between the United States and the Netherlands, allowing
unlimited access to each other's airline markets, paved the way for approval of the
Northwest-KLM deal). Limited U.S. access to British routes is a controversial aspect
of the proposed British Airways investment in USAir, and Congress has pressed for
access concessions as a condition to approval of the British Airways offer. See also
State Dept. Nominee Urged to Open British Ainvays to U.S. Carrier, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 26, 1993, at 5.
161. See British Air Drops Bid to Acquire 44 Percent Stake in Troubled USAir,
supra note 159, at D-3 (quoting the Secretary of Transportation in the Bush Administration, Andrew Card, Jr., as advocating raising the allowable limit of foreign voting
stock ownership from 25 to 49%).
162. See WASH. TRADE DAILY, Jan. 25, 1993, at 2 (explaining that the Chairman
of Delta Airlines, Ronald Allen, called for a moratorium on foreign investment in
United States airlines in response to the British Airways offer discussed supra). A
recent study by the Economic Strategy Institute found that foreign air carriers with
protected home routes are injuring lower cost U.S. carriers, and called for a ban on
foreign airlines' investment in U.S. airlines, unless reciprocal rights were implemented
in the investor's home market. ECONOMIC STRATEGY INsTITUTE, REPORT (July 1993).
The report cited the British Airways investment as one that should have been prohibited. Id.
163. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: IMPACT OF CHANGING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CONTROL LIMITS ON U.S. AIRLINES, Jan. 10, 1993. See
supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing a report by the Economic Strategy
Institute that concluded that non-reciprocal investment access would injure U.S. competition).
164. See supra notes 162, 163 and accompanying text (discussing how foreign
carriers may operate in the U.S. airline industry).
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existing U.S. air carrier.'
2.

Maritime Restrictions

Foreign companies face two basic types of restrictions on their participation in the U.S. maritime industry-those on domestic transport
(coastal and inland waters), and those on international transport. In addition to explicit restrictions on foreign maritime investment, U.S. law
discourages foreign investment by curtailing the operations of foreignowned marine-transport companies and vessels.
a. Domestic Transport
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920166 contains the "Jones Act," a
law providing that merchandise moving between ports in the United
States must be transported on U.S.-built, owned and registered vessels. 67 Foreign investment in companies or vessels operating in this
trade could jeopardize their viability. Under the Jones Act, the Secretary
of the Treasury is given discretion to suspend these requirements with
respect to countries granting reciprocal treatment, but suspension of this
kind is granted only in extraordinary circumstances. Coastal and
intercoastal restrictions are administered by the United States Customs
Service and the Coast Guard,168 and inland trade is governed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
b.

International Transport

The Shipping Act of 1916169 sets forth a direct restriction on foreign

165. The Federal Aviation Act previously was more restrictive, requiring that notice be provided to the Treasury Department and the United States Attorney General
before such an indirect foreign entry into United States air commerce. 49 U.S.C. §
1378(b)(1) (1988). This provision was terminated in 1989, however, and there no
longer are specific restrictions on foreign investment in the United States aircraft
industry. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1988). Controls under 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b)(1) were terminated in 1989 pursuant to the provisions found in 49 U.S.C. § 1551. Id. Of course,
other restrictions, such as Exon-Florio and Hart-Scott-Rodino, discussed supra, may
apply.
166. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 861-889 (1988).
167. 46 U.S.C. app. § 883 (1988).
168. 19 C.F.R. § 4.8 (1992).
169. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 801-842 (1988).
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investment. The Shipping Act requires the approval of the Secretary of
Treasury before a U.S. vessel can be transferred to a non-U.S. citizen,170 with certain narrow exceptions.'
Furthermore, there are three major laws which prevent foreign vessels
from carrying certain United States Government cargo, by authorizing or
directing government agencies to ship preferentially on U.S. flag vessels
on non-competitive terms. First, the*Cargo Preference Act of 1954172
requires that at least half of specified government-generated cargo be
transported on privately-owned, U.S.-flag commercial vessels, when they
are available at fair and reasonable rates. Second, the Cargo Preference Act requires that all cargoes covered must be shipped on U.S.-flag
vessels, subject to significant waiver authority.
Third, the Cargo
Preference Act of 1904" 5 requires all items procured for or owned by
the military departments to be carried exclusively on U.S.-flag vessels. 76 There recently have been proposals to relax these restrictions,
but none have been adopted as of the date of this Article. 77 D.

BANKING

While banking traditionally has been an area with few restrictions on
foreign activity and investment,7 the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 199117' establishes more stringent rules for federal
supervision of foreign banks seeking to invest or operate in the United
States. The Supervision Enhancement Act requires Federal review prior
to a foreign bank's establishment of branches, agencies or commercial
lending company subsidiaries in the United States. 80

170. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 808(c); 835(b), (e) (1988).

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

46
46
46
46
10

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

app. §§ 1181, 31322(a)(1)(b), 31328 (1988).
§ 1241 (1988).
app. § 1241(b)(1) (1988).
§ 1241-1 (1988).
§ 2631 (1988).

176. Vessels owned by the United States also may be eligible for construction and
operating subsidies not available to foreign vessels. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1171 (1988).
177. See Bill Mongelluzzo, Alameda CorridorRail Talks Back on Track, J. COM.,
Oct. 14, 1993, at Al (discussing recent proposals in Congress).
178. See Timothy J. Sheehan, Foreign Acquisition of U.S. Banking Institutions:
The Current Climate, 4 Wis. INT'L. L.J. 20 (1985) (discussing the history of controls
on foreign investment).
179. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2286 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.A.).
180. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d) (Supp. IV 1992). The relevant standards for approval
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The Foreign Bank Act also authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to
terminate a foreign bank's U.S. activities and offices if it finds that the
foreign bank has violated U.S. law or engaged in an unsafe and unsound banking practice."' The Federal Reserve Board also is empowered to order a foreign bank that operates a state branch or subsidiary to
terminate its activities if it finds the foreign bank is not properly regulated in its home country or has violated legal banking norms."
General investments by foreigners in U.S. banks also are regulated in
certain circumstances. In particular, the act requires disclosure of any
purchase of shares in a U.S. bank with the use of loans from a foreign
bank that were secured by such shares." 3 Foreign banks must be careful to comply with the act, as penalties can be severe. The act provides
for a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each day during which a violation continues."s Further, there is a three-tiered penalty system for
failure to make required reports, ranging in severity from maximums of
$2,000 to $1,000,000 per day for inadvertent and knowing violations,
respectively. 5

are: 1) whether a foreign bank engages in banking abroad and is subject to comprehensive supervision in its home country; 2) whether the home country regulator has
approved the U.S. office; 3) the financial and managerial resources of the foreign
bank; 4) whether the foreign bank has provided adequate assurances on the availability of information to the U.S. regulatory agency; and 5) whether the foreign bank is
in compliance with all applicable U.S. laws. Id.
181. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
182. Id. In particular, the Federal Reserve must examine if: 1) the foreign bank is
not subject to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by the
authorities in its home country; or 2) there is reasonable cause to believe that such
foreign bank, or any of its affiliate, has committed a violation of law or engaged in
an unsafe or unsound banking practice in the United States, and as a result of such
practice(s), its continued operation would not be consistent with the public interest or
the purposes of the applicable statutes. Id.
183. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(9) (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring financial institutions
that are secured by shares of insured depository institutions to file reports with federal
regulators).
184. 12 U.S.C. § 3110(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
185. 12 U.S.C. § 3110(c) (Supp. IV 1992). The first tier penalty of not more than
$2,000 per day applies to any foreign bank, branch, agency, other office, or subsidiary of a foreign bank that: 1) maintains procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any
inadvertent error and, unintentionally and as a result of such error, either fails to
make required reports within the time period specified by the appropriate federal
banking agency, or submits false or misleading reports; or 2) inadvertently transmits
or publishes any report that is minimally late. Id. The second tier penalty of not
more than $20,000 per day applies to any foreign bank, branch, agency other office,
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There also are certain longstanding restrictions on bank operations by
foreigners at the federal level. The National Bank Act 8 ' provides that
all directors of national banks must be U.S. citizens. Further, at least
two-thirds of the directors on the board of a national bank must reside
in the state where the bank is located or within 100 miles of the
bank. " The Comptroller of the Currency may waive the citizenship
requirements for a minority of the directors of a national bank that is a

subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign bank. 88
Notwithstanding these restrictions on directors, there are no federal

statutory or regulatory citizenship requirements restricting ownership or
control of, or investment in, national banks. Subject to the provisions of
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act, foreign banks generally

may own federally or state-chartered banks, and may establish federal or
state branches or agencies.

9

The general federal policy regarding the

regulation of U.S. branches of foreign banks has been and, for the most
part, continues to be, to afford them national treatment. Therefore, provided it can satisfy the newly imposed regulatory requirements, a foreign
bank wishing to engage in full service wholesale and retail banking in
the United States generally has the choice of establishing a direct branch
in the United States, or establishing or acquiring a federally or statechartered bank."9
E. ENERGY RESOURCES
Foreign investment in various sectors of the energy industry in the

or subsidiary of a foreign bank that: 1) fails to make required reports within the time
period specified by the appropriate federal banking agency; or 2) submits false or
misleading reports. Id. The third tier penalty of not more than $1,000,000 or one
percent of total assets of the foreign bank, branch, agency, other office, and subsidiary of a foreign bank, whichever is less, is imposed per day and applies to any
foreign bank, branch, agency, other office, or subsidiary of a foreign bank that knowingly or with reckless disregard for the accuracy of any report submits false or misleading reports. Id.
186. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1988).
188. Id. Some states also prescribe the citizenship and residence of directors of
banks organized under their laws. Id.
189. See supra note 180 (establishing that a branch or agency in the United States
is the major alternative to organization or acquisition of a national or state bank).
Despite the fact that there may be no federal limitations, a number of states prohibit
or restrict foreign bank ownership of banks organized under their laws. Id.
190. Sheehan, supra note 178, at 44.
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United States is restricted under several laws.
1. Mining
The Mining Law of 1987'91 limits the right to explore for minerals
and to purchase lands containing such deposits to "citizens of the United
States and those who have declared their intention to become such."' 92
These prohibitions are enforced by the Department of the Interior.
Although the Mining Law generally bars foreign corporations and
individuals from holding mining claims or mineral deposits in public
lands, judicial and administrative courts have construed the citizenship
requirement to allow domestic corporations owned by foreign persons
access to minerals on public lands. 93 Foreign-owned corporations are
considered citizens of the United States if they are organized under U.S.
law, and thus may exercise federal mining claims under the law. 4
2.

Nuclear Energy

Foreign investment in the U.S. nuclear energy industry, both in power
plants and operations prospecting for uranium and other source material,
is largely proscribed. As amended, the Atomic Energy Act of 195495
effectively bars foreign ownership of companies operating in the nuclear
power industry. The Atomic Energy Act contains a section that regulates
the licensing of production facilities that use nuclear materials, and
prohibits the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) from issuing a
license to "an alien or any corporation or other entity if the NRC knows
or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled or dominated by an
alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government."' 96
191. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1988).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Doe v. Waterloo Mining Co., 70 F. 455, 463 (C.D. Cal. 1895)
(presuming that stockholders of a corporation, organized under state laws and party to
an action, are citizens of that state); Duncan v. Eagle Rock Gold Mining and Reduction Co., 111 P. 588 (Colo. 1910) (holding that a corporation organized under state
law need not prove the citizenship of its stockholders); Jackson v. White Cloud Gold
Mining and Mill Co., 85 P. 639 (Colo. 1906) (holding that a corporation organized
under state law is not required to prove its stockholders' citizenship).
194. 30 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
195. Atomic Energy Act of Aug. 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1988). The Atomic Energy Act generally prohibits
license granting to any person within the United States if, in the opinion of the Com-
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The Atomic Energy Act also authorizes the United States Department
of Energy to issue leases or permits for exploring or mining nuclear
source material in land belonging to the United States.'97 Under this
authority, the Energy Department may restrict the mining rights of foreign entities.'
3.

Oil and Gas

The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920' restricts foreign procurement of leases to explore and extract deposits of coal, oil, oil shale, gas,
and various nonfuel minerals on United States Government lands, with

certain exceptions. Specifically, only foreigners from countries which
grant reciprocal mineral leasing privileges to citizens or corporations of
the United States may invest in exploration leases."s° Subject to the
same reciprocity requirements, foreigners also are permitted to hold indi-

rect interests in leases granted under the act, by owning stock in a U.S.
corporation that is qualified to hold exploratory leases." 1
Foreigners also may be restricted from importing or exporting natural
gas, pursuant to the discretion granted the Energy Department under the
Natural Gas Act. 2 While the Natural Gas Act does not explicitly reference controls on foreign entities, it requires persons seeking to import

or export natural gas to obtain authorization from Department of Energy.203 Such authorization is granted only if consistent with the "public
interest," which often is interpreted as against foreign involvement." 4
mission, the issuance of a license to such person would be inimical to the common
defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d),
2134(d) (1988).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 2097 (1988) (authorizing issuance of mining leases). The
Atomic Energy Act's coverage, however, is limited to federal land not encompassed
by the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, discussed infra. See 42 U.S.C. § 2098(c)
(1998) (exempting previously existing mining claims f'rom provisions of the Atomic
Energy\Act).
199. Id.
199. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988).
200. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988); 43 C.F.R. § 3102.2 (1992). Under the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act, the Secretary of the Interior can only grant leases to aliens, including U.S. domestic corporations controlled by foreign persons, whose nation allows
U.S. citizens similar or like privileges. 43 C.F.R. § 3102.2 (1992).
201. 43 C.F.R. § 3102.2 (1992).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1988).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)(2) (1988) (requiring authorization for imports and exports
of natural gas).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1988). While the law is nominally non-discriminatory,
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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act2 5 authorizes the leasing of
oil and natural gas in the offshore area comprising the continental shelf
of the United States. The regulations implementing the law provide that
leases may be issued only to U.S. citizens, aliens or U.S.-organized
corporations. 2"
4. Other Resources
The Federal Power Act2 7 authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to issue licenses to construct and to operate power plants
on public lands." 8 Under the Federal Power Act, licenses may be
granted only to U.S. citizens and domestic corporations. "°
Finally, under the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970,21 the issuance of
leases for geothermal steam development and utilization is restricted to
"'
U.S. citizens and corporations organized under U.S. law.21
F. COMMERCIAL FISHERIES
The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1989 limits foreign investment
in the U.S. commercial fishing industry by imposing restrictions on
foreign ownership of vessels which are permitted or documented to
operate in the U.S. fishing industry." In particular, vessels documented for U.S. fisheries must be owned by U.S. citizens.213

the nationality of an entity seeking such authorization is a significant consideration of
the Energy Department. Id.
205. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988).
206. 43 C.F.R. § 3102.1 (1992). These regulations were promulgated by the Interior Department. Id. Of course, as noted supra, U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations may operate under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
207. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-825 (1988).
208. 16 U.S.C. § 797(a) (1988). In particular, the Commission must license facilities involved the "development, transmission, and utilization" of power on land and
water that are under the control of the United States Government. Id.
209. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1988); see supra note 193 and accompanying text (noting that a domestic corporation is one that is organized under U.S. law, and thus
may include a foreign-based corporation).
210. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (1988).
211. 30 U.S.C. § 1015 (1988).
212. 46 U.S.C. § 12102 (1988) (describing those vessels eligible for documentation). The prohibitions run to newly documented vessels. Id.
213. 46 U.S.C. § 12102(c) (1988) (requiring that a majority of the voting stock be
held by United States citizens).
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Another law, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976,14 extends U.S. regulatory control over fisheries in the Fisheries
Conservation Zone (FCZ),"5 the area up to 200 nautical miles from
the coast of the United States. While not explicitly restricting investment, the Act limits foreign operations by instituting preferences for
U.S. vessels harvesting fish in the FCZ, and for U.S. fish processors
regarding such fish.2" 6 Foreign flag vessels may operate within the
FCZ only pursuant to U.S. permits issued by the Secretary of State.2" 7
These foreign flag fishing operations are subject to18quotas limiting them
to fish that will not be taken by the U.S. industry.
G. REAL PROPERTY INVESTMENT
Real property regulation is primarily a matter of state law, and the
question of who can hold land is determined by the constitutions, statutes and court decisions of the various states.2" 9 The principal controls
imposed by federal statutes on alien ownership of land concern ownership by nationals of countries with which the United States is at war, or
in connection with a presidential declaration of national emergency."
There also are a number of federal reporting requirements applicable to
foreign land acquisitions, which are discussed below in Part III.
III. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Congress has also enacted a number of laws that, while not imposing
or contemplating restrictions on foreign investment and operation, nevertheless set forth extensive reporting and disclosure requirements for such
transactions. As noted earlier, these investment reporting requirements

214. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988).
215. See 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988) (amending and replacing 1976 language which
had described the FCC).
216. 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (1988) (announcing the sovereign rights of the United
States over fish and fish management in designated zones).
217. 16 U.S.C. § 1824(b)(l)-(2) (1988).
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988).
219. As noted supra, this Article does not reach state restrictions.
220. See generally International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988) (defining national emergency and the exercise of Presidential authority during such emergencies); Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50
U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1-44 (1988) (defining the purposes and applications of the prohibition on trade with wartime enemies).
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should be considered part of the U.S. investment control regime. The
requirements afford the United States a measure of protection via the
monitoring of foreign investment. Further, mandatory submission of
reports are to some extent burdens on foreign investment, and in certain
cases may deter potential investors concerned about negative political
reaction or press coverage given the sensitivity of foreign investment.
It is incumbent on the foreign investor to take these diverse requirements seriously, so that they identify applicable reporting obligations and
submit accurate responsive information. Failure to file can exact strong
penalties,22' and failure to report information accurately may expose a
foreign investor to penalties for false statements, including possible
imprisonment.222
A.

THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT SURVEY ACT OF 1976

The International Investment Survey Act of 1976 (IISA),2" imposes
the most comprehensive reporting requirements applicable to foreigners.
The ilSA authorizes both the Commerce Department to monitor direct
foreign investmene24 and the Treasury Department to monitor indirect
or "portfolio" investments.m In order to carry out its monitoring functions, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Commerce Department
issued implementing regulations226 requiring so-called "United States
221. See infra notes 222, 236, 243, 248, and accompanying text (discussing the
extent of penalties imposed).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (punishing those guilty of submitting false information with fines of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to five years). In addition to
the requirements discussed infra, legislation has been proposed in recent years to
impose further reporting requirements on foreign investors. The most burdensome and
controversial was the so-called "Bryant bill" in 1989, which would have required all
foreign investors (those holding or acquiring a five percent or greater interest in a
U.S. concern) to register with the Commerce Department. See Tate, supra note 12,
for further discussion of the bill.
223. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988).
224. 22 U.S.C. § 3102(10) (1988) (defining direct foreign investment as the direct
or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting securities of a United States
business by a foreign person).
225. 31 C.F.R. § 129.1 (1992) (setting forth the Treasury Department's implementing regulations under International Investment Survey Act (IISA)); 31 C.F.R. §
129.4-.5 (1992) (requiring stockholders of certain issues to file periodic reports). The
following discussion will focus on the Commerce Department rles because they are
more extensive and apply directly to the foreign investor.
226. 15 C.F.R. § 806 (1992) (setting forth the Commerce Department implementing regulations for the IISA).
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affiliates" of foreign companies to file various reports concerning their
financial status and activities. 7 "United States affiliates" are defined
as U.S. companies in which a foreign person has a direct investment of
10% or more.'
Under the Commerce Department rules, periodic reports must be filed
quarterly and annually by such "United States affiliates," and a more
comprehensive report must be filed every 5 years. 9 Additional forms
are required when foreign entities first acquire 10% or more of the
voting shares of a U.S. company," ° or when existing United States affiliates of foreign entities acquire additional U.S. business enterpris23 1
es.
There are notable exceptions to these requirements for smaller enterprises. United States affiliates generally are exempt from the reporting
requirements where the total cost of the acquisition is$1 million or less
and does not involve the purchase of 200 acres or more of U.S. real
property. However, even if the United States affiliate is exempt from
filing a comprehensive fifth year investment survey, it still must file an
2,
exemption claim.1
Because the stated purpose of the ISA is to collect data for informational and statistical purposes, it explicitly provides that information
submitted is afforded confidential treatment. The Secretary of Commerce
is required to submit an annual report on the level and significance of
foreign investment to Congress, but leaks to the press are possible,
especially regarding politically sensitive deals. 3 Although the Presi-

227. 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1988).
228. 22 U.S.C. § 3102(10) (1993).
229. See 22 U.S.C. § 3103(b) (1988) (describing reports required by IISA); 15
C.F.R. § 806.15 (1992) (listing forms to be used for various reports). The quarterly
report must be filed on Form BB-605. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(h). In addition, the annual
report must be filed on Form BB-15. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(i). Finally, the comprehensive must be filed on Form BE-12. 15 C.F.R. § 806.150)(2).
230. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(j)(3)(i) (1992) (requiring Form BE-13 in such circumstances).
231. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(j)(3)(ii) (1992) (requiring Form BE-13 in such circumstances). Form BE-607 also must be filed to set forth the industrial classification of a
new foreign affiliate, or when the classification of an existing affiliate changes. 15
C.F.R. § 806.150)(1).
232. 15 C.F.R. § 806.150)(3) (1992). United States affiliates also are exempt fromfiling quarterly submissions if total assets, sales and net income were each less than
$20 million. 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(h)(2)(i). Annual reports are not required for affiliates
where the asset, sales and net income levels are below $10 million. Id.
233. 22 U.S.C. § 3104(c) (1988) (defining permissible use of information collect-
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dent may authorize the exchange of information within and between
agencies, information shared in this manner is to be used confidentially
for analytical or statistical purposes only.' In this connection, Congress amended IISA via the Foreign Direct Investment and International
Financial Data Improvements Act, to authorize the exchange of foreign
investment data between the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics."
IISA provides for civil penalties of up to $10,000 for companies
failing to furnish required information, and for an injunction commanding compliance. Under the Act and applicable regulations, "willful"
failure to submit required information also may be criminally punishable
by fines of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment of up to one year.3 6
B.

THE AGRICULTURE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DIscLosuRE

ACT OF

1978
The Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978
(AFIDA) 37 requires foreign persons to file a report with the Department of Agriculture if they directly or indirectly hold a "significant
interest in or substantial control of"'23 entities that own or lease agricultural land in the United States. The Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture promulgates
and administers implementing regulations."
Under this law, a "foreign person" includes not only a foreign citizen
or a corporation organized with a principal place of business in a foreign country, but also a U.S. company in which a foreign entity holds
an interest of only 10% or more." "Agricultural" land means any land
that presently or within the past 5 years has been used for farming,

ed).
234. 15 C.F.R. § 806.5 (1992).
235. 22 U.S.C. § 3104(d) (1988). IISA does not authorize information exchange
with other agencies such as the Treasury Department, and contains provisions to
maintain the confidentiality of the data and to prevent disclosure of the identity of reporting parties. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3104(c), (e); 3143(d); 3144.
236. 22 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 806.6 (1992) (authorizing civil and
criminal penalties for violations).
237. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1988).
238. 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(k)(1)-(3) (1992) (defining "significant interest in, or substantial control of").
239. 7 C.F.R. § 781.1 (1992).
240. 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(g)(l)-(4) (1992) (defining the term "foreign person").
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ranching, forestry or timber production.24 In contrast to reports under

the USA, these reports are available for public inspection.242 Inadvertent or willful noncompliance with the reporting requirements is subject
to penalty under the AFIDA, which may be as severe as 25% of the
acquisition value."43
C. FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND REAL PROPERTY-TAX ACT OF 1989
The Foreign Investment and Real Property Tax Act of 1989
(FIRPTA) 2" was enacted to amend the Internal Revenue Code by extending tax liability to foreign investors selling or disposing of real
property interests in the United States. FIRPTA sets forth complex tax
rules governing such transactions which are outside the scope of this
Article.245
FIRPTA is mentioned in this discussion because, as legislated, it
imposes annual reporting requirements on foreign entities holding U.S.
real property interests. 246 These requirements have not yet become effective, however, because the Treasury Department has not issued regulations as of the date of this Article, and it is unclear when, or even
whether, the Treasury Department will do so. 7 If implemented, these

241. 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(b) (1992); see 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(c) (1992) (defining an interest in such land as including not only ownership, but also leaseholds of ten years
or more).
242. 7 C.F.R. § 781.3(a) (1992).
243. 7 U.S.C. § 3502 (1992); 7 C.F.R. § 781.4 (1992) (detailing the Department
of Agriculture's broad discretion in imposing fines on non-complying parties).
244. 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 897, 6039C (Supp. 1 1989).
245. See I.R.C. § 897 (1989) (setting forth the complex tax rules of Foreign Investment and Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA)). The foreign investor should carefully
analyze the tax consequences of a proposed investment in the United States. Id. §
897(c)(1). Under these rules, which cover not only the taxation of gains on sales of
U.S. real property, but also income from U.S. acquisitions, and dividends from U.S.
investments. Id.; see also Charles R. Irish & Mike G. Reinecke, United States Taxation of Foreign Materials, 4 WiS. INT'L LJ. 1 (1985) (discussing generally the taxation of foreign materials).
246. I.R.C. § 6039C (1989). A U.S. real property interest can include not only
general real estate, but also investments in energy producing properties such as mines
and wells, as well as interests in U.S. real estate holding companies. I.R.C. §
897(c)(1) (1989).
247. LR.C. § 6039C (1989). FIRPTA authorized the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations to require reporting in foreign persons holding direct investments
in U.S. real property interests. Id. Debate over the reporting system led to the tax
withholding system currently in place, which makes it doubtful, despite the language
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requirements would treat a foreign person as holding a direct investment
in U.S. real property interests during any calendar year if: 1) the foreign
person did not engage in U.S. trade or business at any time during the
calendar year; and 2) the fair market value of the U.S. real property
interest held directly by the person at any time during the calendar year
amounted to $50,000 or more. These requirements also would provide
for significant penalties for failure to submit required information.248
D.

THE CURRENCY AND FOREIGN TRANSACTION REPORTING

ACT

A comprehensive review of reporting requirements should include
mention of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act
(CFTRA)249 which contains a set of transaction reporting requirements
that apply to both domestic and foreign investors. Domestic and foreign
persons"0 who physically transport, mail or ship currency or other
monetary instruments to or from the United States in excess of $10,000
must file a Report of International Currency or Monetary Instruments
with the United States Customs Service."' A transfer of funds through
normal banking procedures that does not involve the physical transportation of currency or monetary instruments, as well as warehouse receipt
and bills of lading, are excluded from the reporting requirement."
Each person subject to U.S. jurisdiction having an interest in, or other
of the law, that Treasury will implement the reporting requirements, any time in the
foreseeable future. Id.
248. Id. The fine is $25 for each day that the failure to submit information continues. Id. The law limits the total fine, however, to the lesser of $25,000 or 5% of
the aggregate fair market value of the U.S. real property interests owned by the person at any time during the year. I.R.C. § 6652(f) (1989).
249. 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988).
250. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(n) (1992) (defining domestic and foreign persons as
"an individual, a corporation, a partnership, a trust or estate, a joint stock company,
an association, a syndicate, joint venture or other unincorporated organization or
group, and all entities cognizable as legal personalities . . . ").
251. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988) and 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1992) (reporting requirement may be satisfied by filing a Customs Form 4790). The $10,000 limit comprises all transactions in the aggregate on one occasion. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1992).
The filing requirements also apply to persons who cause such transactions to occur,
or who attempt to do so. Id. Additionally, each person who receives monetary instruments in an amount greater than $5,000 at one time transported into the United States
from or through a place outside the United States is required to file such report. Id.
Generally, this will include the transportation of U.S. coins and currency, travelers'
checks, bearer negotiable instruments, incomplete instruments and banker securities. Id.
252. Id.
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authority over, any type of foreign financial account in a foreign country
is required to report the existence of the account to the Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) for each year in which such relationship exists.

3

Finan-

cial institutions
also are required to file reports with the IRS 5 on
currency transactions" of amounts over $10,000. 7 Although this requirement applies to banks, and targets neither investors nor foreigners,

foreign investors may be concerned that U.S. financial institutions must
provide the IRS, with detailed information pertaining to covered transactions, including information about the individuals, corporations, and fi-

nancial institutions involved
E.

58

SECURITIES REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Finally, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires a
party acquiring a direct or indirect ownership of 5% or more of any
stock of a registered company to file a report. This requirement also
applies to both domestic or foreign entities. 9 The report must be filed
within 10 days of an acquisition and requires disclosure of the citizenship or place of incorporation of the beneficial owner.' Penalties. for
failure to file, as well as for filinig false information, include criminal

253. 31 C.F.R. § 103.24(a) (1992). These requirements do not apply to foreign
subsidiaries of a United States person. Id. Treasury Department regulations also require specified financial institutions to disclose in detail certain transactions with designated foreign financial agencies. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(a) (1992).
254. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(i) (1992). Financial institutions are defined broadly to
include: insured, commercial and investment banks; agencies or branches of foreign
banks in the U.S.; operators of credit card systems; brokers or dealers in securities or
commodities; currency exchanges; investment companies; insurance companies; loan or
finance companies; thrift institutions; travel agencies; pawnbrokers; dealers in precious
metals, stones or jewels; and telegraph companies. Id.
255. See id. (reporting requirement may be fulfilled by filing an IRS Form 4789).
256. Id. Currency transactions include deposits, withdrawals, exchanges of currency
or other payment, transfer by, through or to such financial institution that involves a
transaction in currency or more than $10,000. Id; 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1992).
257. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1992). Multiple transactions by or for the same
person on any one day are treated as a single transaction if the financial institution is
aware of them. Id.
258. Id. The penalties applicable to a financial institution for failure to make a required report is the greater of $100,000 or the amount of the reportable transaction.
Id.
259. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g) (1988) (requiring filings to be made on SEC
Form 13-D).
260. Id.
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liability. 261
CONCLUSION
With the growth of multinational corporations and the globalization of
national economies, it is imperative that the President set forth a clear
policy on foreign investment, based on its consideration of the merits
and liabilities involved. 62 This policy naturally should define the national objectives of the United States in controlling foreign investment
and operations, and by practical extension, it should provide the framework for the appropriate investment control statutory regime to best
satisfy these objectives. It is manifest that the current system, comprising an array of direct and indirect restrictions, impediments, reporting
requirements, and related exceptions, implemented by the spectrum of
agencies, under numerous federal statutes, should be reconsidered and
revised to carry out the defined national goals.
The increasing importance of the foreign investment question and the
dubious effectiveness of the current framework call on the President to
authorize a formal review of the present legal system controlling foreign
investment, based on clearly articulated national objectives, with recommendations for necessary revisions. The President has authority to mandate such a report under the USA.263 There is precedent in other areas,
most recently in the U.S. trade relief laws, for an agency to analyze an
existing legal framework perceived to be in need of revision, and to
provide a proposal for rationalizing and simplifying the law to make it
coherent and accessible.2"

261. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
262. See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text (discussing that the Clinton
Administration clearly perceives the importance of the issue, and has been debating
this point at length, in the context of the National Economic Council). No policy has
yet emerged on this issue, however. Id.
263. 22 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(2)-(3) (1988). Under the IISA, the President has wide
latitude to conduct studies:
[O]n specific aspects of international investment and trade and services which
may have significant implications for the economic welfare and national security
of the United States; . . . [a]nd to report periodically . . . on national and
international developments with respect to laws and regulations affecting international investment in trade and services . ...
Id.
The President also retains residual authority through requests such as studies. Id.
264. 58 Fed. Reg. 12,253 (1993). On December 16, 1992, the Ways and Means
Committee of the United States House of Representatives requested the United States
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The study should have the following guiding principles: (1) the objective of controls on foreign investment and operations is to protect articulated U.S. national and economic security interests; (2) the controls targeting foreign investment which do not advocate and/or carry out these
goals should be eliminated as unnecessary limits on the free flow of
finance and commerce; and (3) because an overlapping and convoluted
system of statutory controls is counterproductive to achieving and monitoring national objectives, redundant or duplicate provisions should be
eliminated, anomalous or overly complex regulations should be simplified, and the system should be rearranged, rationalized and consolidated
under the primary authority of the minimum agencies necessary. To the
extent substantive legal changes are required to achieve these objectives,
they should be set out as legislative proposals in the report.
A presidential request for such a report would galvanize and focus the
debate on what truly are national objectives in the area of foreign investment controls. Moreover, the completion of a report with explicit
proposals for improving the current investment control regime would
serve the country well, by showing the way to a more coherent, consistent and accessible system to gauge whether important U.S. national
objectives are being adequately protected and preserved. At the same
time, it would create a more transparent and predictable investment environment for foreign investors.

International Trade Commission (ITC) to conduct a study and prepare a report concerning the reorganization of U.S. trade relief laws under 19 U.S.C. § 1332(g). The
ITC was requested to carry out the following objectives: "(1) the logical and accessible arrangement of the law; (2) the elimination of duplicate provisions; and (3) the
elimination or simplification of anomalous or illogical provisions, to the extent that
this is possible without substantive or procedural changes to the existing provisions of
the law." Id. at 12,253-54. In any report on the current regime for foreign investment,
the report should recommend changes to any anomalous or illogical provisions which
would require substantive or procedural changes. Id.

